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RISK AND “RISK SOCIETY” IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Soraya Boudia and Nathalie Jas 
 
 
Since the mid-1980s “risk” has constituted a sort of banner to which the social sciences have 
rallied. It has given rise to a whole range of research in the political science, sociology and 
economics spheres. Concepts such as Patrick Lagadec‟s “Risk Civilization”, Ulrich Beck‟s 
“Risk Society”, or Anthony Giddens “Risk Culture”1 symbolize and underpin this movement, 
which, although polymorphic, is built around a common premise: the conviction that risk is a 
characteristic feature of contemporary societies and a central parameter when analyzing them. 
Our “modernity” is seen as part of a radical break that occurred around the early 1970s born out 
of the transition from an “industrial” to a “post-industrial” or “risk society”, in which humanity 
must deal with a set of global risks that it has itself engendered through its scientific and 
technological activities for which the planet has become a vast laboratory. Paradoxically, in 
order to handle these “risks”, our societies have an even greater need for science and technology 
which alone can provide the conceptual and technical tools to enable mankind to grasp, identify, 
quantify, classify and guard against such risks. These transformations are also reflected in an 
unprecedented development of regulatory measures concerning administrative control and 
management systems at local, national and international levels. 
 
What is the role of history in analyzing risks in the fields of science and technology? Given that 
fundamental societal evolutions as well as change and disruption over the long term are 
constantly being examined, recourse to history would seem only natural. Reflecting a type of 
analysis common in the social sciences
2
, the temporality constructed by Beck characterizes and 
differentiates between two successive periods. The first is that of an industrial society: a class 
society corresponds to a “primary modernization” according to Beck‟s own terminology. In the 
second, that of risk society, we are supposed to live in a “reflexive modernity”. To back up this 
historical analysis of a break created by risk society, Beck cites a large number of works of 
economic and social history in German from the 1970s and 80s and underlines the importance 
of the sciences in the transformations he analyses. However, on „scientific/technical‟ questions, 
Beck‟s references are rather poor3 and since this seminal work, historical research is no longer a 
resource for the many sociologists and political scientists that have come in his wake and 
continued to brandish the concept of “risk society”.  
 
The explanation may lie in the small number of historical works that place the idea of risk at the 
centre of their analysis. Moreover, when historical studies do actually deal with situations of 
danger or risk, they often lack visibility given the difficulty historians have in promoting their 
work outside narrow specialist circles. Furthermore, the ability of disciplines like sociology or 
political science to respond to social demands and to take part in forms of political action 
enables the fruits of their research to circulate far more easily, to influence long arbitration 
processes, and to come to the attention of others, thus helping them to fashion the present and 
the future and to gain a higher public profile. 
. 
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Starting from this observation, we wish to show the importance of history in considering risk 
and the societal mutations to which it gives rise or in which it plays a central role. Ultimately, 
our aim is to stress the necessity not only to compile a history of “risk”, but also to account for 
the emergence, development and uses of risk and “risk society”. 
 
 
WHY IS HISTORY SO IMPORTANT? 
 
For Beck and other researchers in the social and political sciences, the Post-War boom and the 
triumph of capitalism ushered in a new model of societal organization characterized by a higher 
degree of individualization. Beck sought to analyze the birth of this new society, the new 
problems posed by it, and the political transformations needed to deal with such problems
4
. The 
cornerstone of this analysis is a postulate: the “radical” originality of a society he terms a “risk 
society”. Successive crises resulting from the threats to health and the environment of scientific, 
medical or economic activities that emerged from the early 1970s on are evidence that we have 
embarked on a new era. Such issues remain at the forefront of public debate and have continued 
to mobilize the public and challenge the limits of expert opinion and regulations. Thus, in the 
preface to the second edition of the French translation of Ulrich Beck‟s work, Bruno Latour 
writes: “when Risk Society first appeared, the cloud from Chernobyl was spreading over 
Europe; when this French translation appeared, catastrophe had just struck in Toulouse and in 
New York. Who still needs proof that we have well and truly entered the risk society?”5  
 
Beck‟s work enjoyed great success. He inspired and stimulated the development of a body of 
work that took up the idea of risk society
6
. From our point of view, these analyses had two 
major limitations. Firstly, most of them contended that the risk society began around thirty 
years ago. Thirty years roughly corresponds to what sociologists would consider to be 
“historical” time7. Fixing this “natural” period is interesting: it corresponds to what the average 
adult has experienced, i.e., what they can “remember”. This time span corresponds to the 
individual and collective perception of a past which seems both familiar and sufficiently distant 
to invite consideration from a historical perspective. However, the historian‟s historical 
temporality is longer than “the thirty years gone by” even within the context of a history of the 
present time.  
The second limitation of this periodization lies in it‟s postulating the “radical originality” of the 
“risk society”. This strikingly illustrates a tendency in the social sciences to highlight “breaks 
with the past” and “radical transformations. By contrast, the accumulated practice of historians 
teaches them that radical, total and rapid breaks with the past, even in what are termed 
“revolutions” are often simply recompositions8. This does not mean of course that the historian 
necessarily and invariably argues that nothing new has taken place. Changes - sometimes brutal 
changes - do undoubtedly occur. But even in cases of important and radical transformations, the 
new society being fashioned remains the product of a certain history and is thus partly marked 
by long-term trends which need to be understood. Over and above the differences in 
disciplinary practice, what is at stake here is a conception of the way in which societies change 
and of what determines such transformations.  
 
Indeed in choosing to cover a period of about 170 years and considering events that occurred 
before 1970, the articles presented in this volume seek to offer a series of reflections of the 
construction of a history of “risk”. 
 
 
CROSSING BOUNDARIES, BUILDING A HISTORY OF “RISK” 
 
Developing a history of risk requires adopting a bold position at the crossroads of a number of 
different disciplines. This is why we have decided to focus on and compare the problems, 
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practices and experiences of the sociology of risk and expertise, the analysis of public policy, 
the social and cultural history of the sciences, medical technology and environmental history. 
 
The first area of research tackled by the articles in this volume covers a wealth of literature 
dealing almost exclusively with sociology, political science and law, and they attempt to 
describe a “risk society” characterized by breaks with the past and the fundamental changes that 
have occurred over the last three decades
9
. A large body of research has already dealt with 
public mobilization, policy development, decision-making processes, expertise and its 
procedures, or contemporary regulatory systems. Such work has shown how important it is to 
focus on periods of crisis or public controversy involving the interaction of groups of actors 
with different agendas, forging concepts and deploying them through various actions, 
arguments, justifications and institutional and political realignments. While these works are 
undeniably valuable, they show little interest in the periods when such problems lie dormant. 
However, such crises constitute a long-term phenomenon in many cases
10
 that should invite 
serious analysis of the implementation of decisions and of the modus operandi of regulatory and 
risk management systems when they reappear or new problems emerge. Furthermore, while 
these works have stressed the increasingly important role of science in risk assessment and 
management, the manner in which knowledge and scientists have been studied is frequently 
unsatisfactory. In some cases we may even observe “reductionist” practices: a reductionist 
vision of science, a tendency to treat “experts” as “scientists” or to argue in global terms that 
oppose “experts” and “laymen”11. However, a number of works on the history and sociology of 
science
12
 have shown that when faced with the same scientific problem or the same risk, 
scientists from different backgrounds do not necessarily adopt the same approaches. In such 
cases, analyses in terms of “epistemic culture” as proposed by Karin Knorr-Cetina13 constitute a 
useful tool for getting to grips with and analyzing this type of configuration.  
The second area of research dealt with here is lower profile material and comprises two types of 
historical contributions. Firstly, the social and cultural history of science, technology and 
medicine has produced many works analyzing controversies, expertise, and regulation in the 
context of health and environmental risk situations. The most widely studied of these are 
undoubtedly air and water pollution in towns resulting from expanding urbanization and 
industrialization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Secondly, environmental history in 
its many forms, which has developed from the end of the 1970s on, beginning in the United 
States and to a lesser extent in Europe
14
, is once again analyzing pollution-related health and 
environmental questions. Although the output of such research is less impressive than that 
produced by sociology, law or political science, the analyses proposed by historical works 
covers a broad spectrum: for example, the emergence and “molding” of disciplines and 
scientific professions linked to certain types of hazards, divergence of perceptions, 
interpretations and difficulties of interaction between groups with different practices and 
interests when considering the same risk, the role of economic interests, the concrete effects on 
health and the environment, and the various geographic, social and temporal dimensions of 
hazards caused by human activities.  
 
In building a “history of risk” we consider that the use of hybrid approaches and resources must 
be combined with three other methodological requirements: the historization of the notion of 
“risk”, to analyze a variety of different levels, and comparison. Firstly, it would appear 
necessary to work on the emergence and shaping of the notion of “risk”, which is not an 
intangible datum, but one that emerged out of a multitude of other notions used at other times 
and in various places and circumstances to refer to phenomena connecting economic and 
technological activities, health, environment and politics – e.g., “danger”, “dangerousness”, 
“nuisances”, “harmfulness”, “harm”. Thus, as the constitution of problems, as well as the 
methods of studying and managing them, operate on various social, geographical and temporal 
levels, it is vital to analyze different scales. The constitution of issues of “risk” has to be 
examined locally, at the level of the town or region for example, as well as nationally and 
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internationally, with each level interacting with all the others. Likewise for timescales: a 
problem has its own characteristics at a given time and this need to be understood. However, it 
also comprises different interlocking histories over varying timescales, which also have to be 
reconstructed. Lastly, comparison appears essential in order to achieve temporal or geographic 
perspective. The heuristic dimension of comparison takes on a particular value here as similar 
problems are often encountered in different places and at different times, but are not necessarily 
treated in the same way. Furthermore, comparison also proves particularly useful for tackling 
internationalization phenomena in terms of both the reality of “risks” and how to handle them, 
and multiple forms of influence and resistance in accordance with national and international 
configurations at any given time. 
 
In adopting these methodological approaches, the articles in this issue attempt to construct 
analytical frameworks and research proposals that may contribute to a historization and a 
denaturalization of risk. In this introduction, we propose to highlight four of these.  
 
 
1/ Experts, expertise and regulatory systems do not necessarily have the centrality 
conferred on them by their public profile and the volume of work devoted to them in the 
social sciences.  
 
One of the key elements of “risk society” as it is generally conceived of is the importance and 
centrality of experts, scientific and technical expertise, and regulatory systems. Experts and the 
scientific and technical expertise they can provide have the dual function of identifying and 
characterizing the ever-increasing number and complexity of “risks” that human societies can 
be faced with, and proposing solutions to control and reduce them. Regulation then appears as 
the instrument of control and management of risk par excellence. Instead of considering 
systems of expertise and regulation as specific characteristics of “present-day societies”, the 
articles comprising this issue instead seek to understand how experts, expertise and regulation 
differ from other forms of tackling and managing hazards caused by human activities, how and 
why they have assumed such importance and achieved such a high profile, and what the 
functions attributed to them are. 
 
The increasing threat posed by industrial and urban development in the nineteenth century to 
health and the environment – several examples of which have been examined by Jean-Baptiste 
Fressoz – contributed to the emergence of the figure of the scientist-expert and the history of 
this process remains largely unwritten at present. However, existing research literature provides 
us with some interesting pointers that we will specifically refer to. Various groups of scientists 
mobilized (or were mobilized) to tackle the problems of dangers to health and the environment 
created by human production. The most important – or at least the most prominent in terms of 
existing research literature – were hygienists, doctors, chemists, and engineers15. While these 
groups remain very important, at the turn of the (twentieth) century other groups appear, such as 
microbiologists and toxicologists in the inter-war years. The four case studies presented here 
clearly show that in addition to the variety of different fields there was also a wide range of 
situations and institutions in which expertise was used: the courtroom, the factory, local 
authorities – towns and regions – national governments, and - from the end of the century -,  
international conventions. While in the first part of the nineteenth century, the primary function 
of scientists and engineers was to guide the decisions taken by the courts and local or national 
authorities, the last third of the century saw the emergence of “professional” scientist-experts. 
Their role was mainly to provide expertise, frequently in the context of the implementation of 
new laws and the development of new bodies that were intended, partly at least, to regulate 
potentially hazardous activities
16
. 
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As Fressoz shows, the nineteenth century also saw the emergence of systems for regulating 
dangerous activities. The timeline of the development of such systems varied depending on the 
activities and the countries. Throughout the nineteenth century, in the absence of national 
legislation (and when permitted by the state), local authorities, particularly in the big cities and 
the heavily industrialized regions, tended to take measures aimed at regulating activities 
perceived as dangerous (in particular air and water pollution)
 17
. However, for diverse reasons, 
these measures frequently appeared to be inadequate, leading to the enactment of national 
legislation and regulations. While some laws were enacted at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, there was an increase in the number of such laws from 1870 onwards. There are many 
reasons why the development of regulatory systems gathered pace at the end of the nineteenth 
century. This was certainly a period in which the state extended its influence, while at the same 
time transforming its methods of management, in particular by developing new structures in 
which technical and scientific expertise played a vital role. The last third of the nineteenth 
century and the early years of the twentieth century thus constitute the period in which the 
foundations were laid for a large number of national regulatory systems, particularly for food 
products, medicines and industrial pollution. 
 
The large-scale development of certain activities in the inter-war years led to a number of major 
scandals – involving drugs, pesticides, etc. – 18 and to the development of new forms of 
regulation, characteristic of the second-half of the twentieth century, such as certification or 
restrictions on use. The second-half of the twentieth century witnessed two different trends. The 
first led to science acquiring an unprecedented social influence through its use in developing 
political-scientific-administrative bodies and its contribution to devising and providing 
management and government instruments
19
 essentially intended to build and strengthen a new 
social order on a worldwide scale. The second, closely linked to the first, concerned an 
unprecedented ”boom” in expertise and a shift in the locus of decision-making and action into 
the international arena.. Although this “internationalization” began in the nineteenth century, 
however, as Soraya Boudia‟s article shows, it was really after the Second World War that the 
number of bodies – many of which are still active – increased rapidly in number and 
importance. In this context, experts‟ “spheres of intervention” became ever broader, comprising 
technical, social and political domains. Controversies and protests over the effects of atomic 
weapons, as well research carried out, clearly highlighted the changing nature and scale of the 
dangers with which humanity was confronted. 
 
The emergence and apparent success of scientist-experts, expertise and regulation throughout 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries should not mask the many difficulties encountered. 
While the representatives of many scientific disciplines in many countries and in extremely 
diverse contexts, claimed legitimacy and relevance for the expertise they claimed they could 
provide, they had to face two types of interrelated problem. On the one hand, scientific 
expertise requires clear-cut, definite and unambiguous results. However, such clear-cut findings 
are not in keeping with traditional scientific practice where controversy, debate and uncertainty 
are  not only normal but necessary
20
. The intrinsic difficulty for expertise of producing 
“incontrovertible” knowledge was coupled with competition from other practices and other 
forms of logic at work in the identification, management and handling of risks. As Pierre-
Antoine Dessaux reminds us, chemists had difficulty in being accepted to carry out food 
controls at the end of the nineteenth century and had to assimilate different older and well-
established techniques used by other legally accredited professionals.  
 
All these difficulties led scientists involved in expertise to develop a variety of strategies to deal 
with the attacks made on them and assert their presence and their science
21
. These strategies 
included setting “norms” to “standardize” expertise practices in order to obtain, if not identical 
results, then results with the fewest discrepancies possible. Perfecting standard expertise 
practices and developing recognized systems for experts was an important activity among 
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leading groups of experts. Depending on the context, emphasis was placed on the development 
and promotion of professional societies (UK, Germany) and/or the creation of professional 
diplomas or official accreditations. Legislation officially designated the experts themselves and 
the practices to be used by these experts (France). The difficulty for scientific expertise and for 
experts in adopting prominent positions and supplanting other types of practice is not exclusive 
to the nineteenth century. Their presence, professional survival and visibility all depended on 
the ongoing work that they carried out, which involved many compromises concerning what 
they were able to know or what they knew, and what those with whom they interacted – 
politicians and industrialists for the most part – were able to accept. 
 
Furthermore, while regulatory systems impinged on more and more activities from the end of 
the nineteenth century, became more complex, took on an increasingly national and 
international dimension from the end of the Second World War, and while they expanded 
massively and acquired a high profile, other risk management methods continued to exist, 
especially legal action. While court cases are relatively visible – particularly through media 
coverage –, professional practices, as Nathalie Jas observes in the case of pesticides, continue to 
compete with regulatory systems. This practice, which has relied on other forms of logic, have 
very often aimed to minimize the reality of “risks” and to remove as far as possible the 
constraints that “risks” have constituted once they have actually been recognized. One of these 
forms of practice has been the direct or indirect control of regulatory systems. As such control 
has increasingly proven difficult , avoidance strategies have been put in place
22
. What has been 
vital is the preservation of economic activity, and above all certain modes of economic 
development. 
 
 
2/  Conversely, economic activities often play a central role both in the emergence of the 
notion of risk and in shaping ways of identifying and handling high-risk dossiers.  
 
Placing scientific expertise and regulatory systems at the centre of the analysis has the major 
disadvantage of overestimating the importance of certain groups and their activities which, even 
though they have a high profile, do not necessarily play a key role. The articles presented here 
remind us how important it is not to minimize the roles of other actors: industrialists and those 
with specific visions of economic development at administrative and political levels. What 
emerges from the articles that follow is the centrality of economics within the processes of 
tackling and managing the human health and environmental hazards. Economic considerations 
in particular determine how such dangers are handled. As Dessaux shows in the case of food 
products in France at the start of the twentieth century, setting up a regulatory system was 
primarily a response to economic imperatives for regulating and building markets. Health 
considerations were of secondary importance and had to barge their way onto an agenda 
imposed in order to structure the markets for food products. This approach, which aims to 
incorporate public health and environmental considerations into regulatory systems, was 
intended primarily to facilitate the operation and development of markets, and is found in many 
places at many times. Thus, it is encountered at the heart of many European systems for 
handling “risks‟, particularly hazardous chemical risks23. 
 
On the other hand, in many cases risk management may be used to accommodate industrial and 
technological activities or to enable the development of new ones. As Boudia shows with the 
effects of radiation, rather than aiming to remove or limit dangers, expertise and regulation 
systems sought rather to make certain forms of economic development compatible with the 
expectations and demands of the public. In this perspective, as Jas relates in the case of 
pesticides in France, while scientific expertise and regulation took on great importance, this was 
probably because they represented a resource that could be easily harnessed to industrial and 
economic development
24
 and had the advantage of a certain rhetorical efficacy.  
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This centrality of economic considerations and the ability of systems of expertise and regulation 
to preserve and even to facilitate certain types of economic and social developments, 
undoubtedly explain the success of these systems and the importance they have taken on. The 
fact that the protection of health and the environment has not ultimately been their primary 
function no doubt resulted in recurring long-term crises, the persistence of other forms of 
dealing with risk, in particular court cases, and the development of forms of radical protest that 
aim to draw attention to the dangers that are sometimes masked by expertise- and regulation-
based systems.  
 
 
3/ The history of risk is that of economic and political regimes  
 
As the work of economists and sociologists has shown, risk is not an additional term used to 
refer to a danger: it is a particular danger, where no-one is at fault and the event in question 
cannot be foreseen or calculated. Existing research shows that it is a conception which was 
constructed historically in the sphere of maritime insurance when parties were confronted with 
the impossibility of assigning blame
25
. From the sixteenth century onwards, following the 
destruction of ships in storms, the answer to gaining some measure of control over natural 
hazards without penalizing commerce was “socializing” and “pooling” of the danger. The 
notion of risk unfolded over the nineteenth century with the successive development of several 
types of insurance: agricultural insurance for natural disasters and social insurance for illness 
with differences in forms and timescales in Germany, France and Great Britain in a general 
movement that masked the marked disparities in different national contexts. The success of 
these systems for identifying and managing danger is evidence both of a will to control the 
whims of nature in various sectors of human activity and of the development of the use of 
statistics and the calculation of probabilities in the public domain
26
. 
 
The efficiency of the notion of risk stems from the fact that it does not refer to a particular 
category of event but is a way of conceiving of, objectifying, measuring and managing risks. In 
the course of the twentieth century, the development of insurance contributed to “classifying” a 
wide range of dangers, floods and earthquakes as “natural risks”, domestic accidents as 
“household risks”, and diseases and poisonings as “health risks”. Such a development of the 
notion of risk in the context of the rise of capitalism, underlines that all human activity entails 
inherent dangers and that the objective is not to eradicate them but to control them by placing 
them within a framework and proposing reparation or compensation. Insurance techniques thus 
became a key tool in the management and reparation of risks. This solution had a decisive 
pragmatic and political advantage: it allowed an activity to be carried on even though it was 
dangerous. It called for a radical redefinition of fault and liability, which had been formulated 
using the vocabulary of insurers, erasing all political or moral connotations. Only abuses were 
sanctioned, i.e., damage caused by risks exceeding those judged to be “normal” for a given 
activity on the basis of how this “normality” was defined in the regulatory context of the time. 
In risk situations, it is less a matter of naming the guilty than of deciding who pays.  
 
Risk then appears as a necessary evil, inherent to life in society and something that must be 
controlled and whose source must be regulated. Political and economic choices at the origin of 
any given activity are rendered invisible, natural at most necessary.. Yet despite their „success,‟ 
risk-based approaches continued to encounter opposition and the question of liability remained 
a source of conflict throughout the twentieth century, as is evident from the court cases 
involving tobacco manufacturers or oil slicks.  In the 1950s, the global threat of a nuclear 
accident or war caused people to imagine scenarios for the future based on the calculation of 
probabilities of accidents which, granted, have never happened or are extremely rare, and are 
linked in long chains of cause and effect. These situations with global consequences – violent 
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storms or terrorist threats – have tended to increase. They expose the limits of the concept of 
risk envisaged solely from an insurance perspective and invite a redefinition of the “natural” 
and “technological” dangers generally arising out of human activities. They have led to the 
return of causality in a big way and have already given rise to reconsideration of the terms of a 
risk situation. 
 
The return of liability along with the precautionary principle at the end of the 1980s clearly 
reflects the dead-end in which an insurance-based approach to risk is now situated. However, 
while the issue of liability is an increasingly urgent one, the concept of risk is constantly 
highlighted and extended to ever-wider spheres of activity. Indeed the emergence of risk as a 
“method” of managing problems and, the popularity of the concept of the “risk society” among 
decision-makers and social scientists indicate how political these issues have become today. 
 
 
4/ Shifting the way we look at risk: the importance of what is not visible and of the 
processes of constructive forgetting 
 
History can participate in a movement that aims to significantly enrich, or even to profoundly 
transform our understanding of risk. While the social sciences have generally focused primarily 
on problems made public by the activities of those involved, it seems important to us today to 
refocus the debate on what does not become public, i.e., what remains invisible, whether this be 
related to the problems, mechanisms or the groups involved.  
 
As such, if the work of history may be brought to bear on the ways in which public problems 
emerge, just as sociologists and political scientists do in the case of contemporary issues, the 
historian may seriously consider that the emergence in the public arena of a risk-related issue is 
not linked solely to its objective importance – in terms of harmful consequences or the number 
of deaths. The examples of asbestos or tobacco which involved thousands of deaths over a 
relatively long period are sufficient to prove this. The questions that emerged over health, 
environmental or technological risks are only a part of the work carried out by actors into the 
scientific, political and media aspects in order to make a problem visible and bring it to public 
attention. The historian studying the issues surrounding risks can thus begin to question the 
mechanisms and the forms of social visibility of problems as well as the ways they are handled. 
In doing so, they may come to discover and account for actual or potential health and 
environmental damage resulting from science and technology that has been forgotten and/or 
never properly acknowledged publicly or politically. Historians may also discover ways of 
experiencing, tackling and handling the type of damage caused by human activity that has not 
been analyzed or referred to in policy debates or by the dominant powers.  This movement from 
what was visible to what is less so, or to what is not visible at all, leads us to shift our 
perspectives on those involved, i.e., those who had borne these risks and who, due to a lack of 
cognitive, material or political resources did not manage to make themselves heard. They may 
also be groups, industrialists or government departments with the means to act in order to shape 
the way in which risks were handled, but who, for political reasons, in light of what was at stake 
in a given situation, preferred not to appear on the public stage. This work on historical and 
social invisibility
27
 may ultimately be extended to the study of what caused social and political 
neglect of certain issues, forms of action, or of human and non-human groups. The historian‟s 
objective would then be to analyze the mechanisms at work that made it possible to render risk 
phenomena invisible, or as invisible as possible, not just at the time when the damage occurred 
but also over shorter or longer periods. How did the neglect of health and environmental crises 
and risk situations come to be forgotten given their magnitude at the time they occurred? Why 
and how do crises appear to be “radically” new at the time they occur when similar problems 
had arisen in the past, sometimes only twenty years previously? What were the workings and 
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functions of the political process of forgetting that are manifestly at work where “risks” were 
concerned? 
 
This program could also  highlight the extent to which the actual, potential or proven harm 
caused by human activity to health and the environment are the product of a history, i.e., 
choices made at various levels, at various times, by specific types of actor, to serve certain 
interests. It could highlight the fact that under the generic term of “risks” lie the harsh realities 
of sometimes irreversible social and environmental damage, everyday suffering, feelings of 
injustice and impunity. The case of Bhopal
28
 is a striking example of these phenomena. Thus, a 
history of risks could be a history of “the suffering of humanity” faced with forms of economic, 
political and social organization
29
. Unlike the findings of contemporary research on risk, this 
type of history would stress the limits of social learning from past problems, the forms of 
dissimulation and the playing for time and the irresponsibility of medical institutions, political 
powers or technological businesses. The example of the relocation southwards of the asbestos 
and polluting chemical industries illustrates what we have in mind here. First, a series of 
observations: 1- the regulation of dangerous industrial activities in rich industrial countries has 
only taken place when there were alternative production solutions – new production facilities, 
replacement materials or simply relocation of the activity; 2- A large portion of these activities 
were relocated to countries in the southern hemisphere with full knowledge of the health and 
environmental risks posed by them, even when legal action had started in industrialized 
countries; 3- On-site facilities in southern hemisphere plants take no account of this knowledge; 
4- Governments and international health, environmental or regulatory bodies are aware of these 
situations but take no action in the vast majority of cases.  
 
In reality, describing and researching these issues involves a serious analysis of social order 
which is rarely tackled by most research into risk. Questioning invisibility and its related 
mechanisms requires questioning the chains of responsibility and irresponsibility or the social 
and human cost of the economic and political organization processes at work in our societies, as 
well as underlining the importance of rethinking the concepts of domination and power. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A HISTORY OF “RISK SOCIETY” 
 
To conclude, we wish to pause and consider the importance of analyzing the emergence of the 
concept of “risk society” and thus underline the centrality of its political dimension. The 1980s, 
when Beck and Giddens were producing their first works, were marked firstly by a profound 
challenging of the forms of social management which had had their high point in the 1960s and 
„70s and, secondly, by a certain disillusionment over existing regulations to effectively guard 
against health and environmental hazards linked to scientific and technical developments. The 
Thatcher era broke the trades union movement in Great Britain, the Reagan administration 
strengthened the US Government‟s grip on the Environmental Protection Agency to the benefit 
of industry, and the government of Helmut Kohl in Germany ignored the demands of German 
ecological movements. At that time sociology of risk sought not only to describe and analyze 
the rampant health and environmental crises, but also to account for the transformations that 
marked the end of the “class society” and its mutation into a “risk society”, on which Beck lays 
particular emphasis in his work. Through the concept of “risk society”, Beck and Giddens offer 
not only an analytical tool and an interpretation of the society in which they live - they also 
outline new methods of social management they would like to see implemented in order to help 
counteract both the weakening of so-called “traditional” management methods (trades 
unionism, class struggle, political parties with clearly defined proposals) and the dangers that 
modernity imposes on the whole of humanity
30
.  
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This political element in risk has been central for a large number of researchers whose works 
have dealt with risk society. However, on account of their academic discipline, political 
background or the subject of their analysis, they have given a diversity of meanings to the 
“political”. In a large number of works on science and technology, politics was treated as a 
critique of technocratic methods used in decision-making processes and researchers lauded the 
methods used by groups of concerned citizens to barge their way into cases involving risk. 
Many social researchers have seized on risk as a means of devising tools that aim to reform 
such decision-making methods and, ultimately, to overhaul the methods for organizing science 
and technology on the one hand, and social issues on the other. This generated a large body of 
research into the role and impact of science on risk which came to dominate the field and dealt 
with participatory democracy, deliberative procedures (citizens‟ conferences and hybrid forums, 
for example) and standards for good governance in science as emphasized by Dominique 
Pestre. The aim was to get citizens to take part in political decisions by promoting innovative 
discussion and decision-making forums. These works gave rise to theories on good science and 
the co-production of more socially robust expertise, coming as it would from a wider consensus 
between scientists, politicians and lay people
31
. Heralded as a panacea for all ills, deliberative 
procedures appeared to be the management method par excellence not only for many currently 
existing risks and for the conflicts that could arise from them, but also for socio-economic 
problems in general. 
The concepts of “risk” and “risk society” had great success among policy-makers and managers 
who adopted the ideas of a new form of governance based on a broader social base for political 
decision-making and co-management with stakeholders in various social sectors. Some social 
scientists contributed to the design and implementation of this new form of governance. 
Another approach would adopt a radically different posture in relation to this new governance, 
i.e., question what it is, how it came to be (and to be deployed), and then go on to propose 
another history of societal mutations over the last thirty years with a more reflective and critical 
perspective. 
 
We would like to thank Dominique Pestre, John Krige and Yves Cohen for their very useful 
comments. 
 
                                                 
NOTES 
 
1
 Lagadec, Major Technological Risk; Beck, Risk Society; Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity. 
2
 This way of reasoning, through successive models is, for instance, to be found in „mode 1‟ / 
„mode 2‟ proposal: Nowotny, Scott, Gibbons, Re-thinking Science.  
3
 See the critic of Beck‟s vision of sciences in the Brian Wynne‟s introduction of Lash, 
Szerszynski and Wynne, Risk, Environment and Modernity.  
4
 Beck has continued to explain his conceptions see his last book: Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision 
(First published in German in 2004). 
5
 Beck, Risk Society, 7. 
6
 It would be very difficult to make an exhaustive list of these numerous works. The importance of 
this concept is visible in the content of a number of articles of journals such as Social Studies of 
Sciences, Science & Technology Studies or Science, Technology and Human Values, as well as in 
the creation of new journals specifically dedicated to risks such as Risk Analysis.  
7
 This is especially noticeable in research on the transformation of capitalism or medicine over 
the last 30 years: Boltanski and Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism. (First published in 
French in 1999). Dodier, Leçons politiques de l'épidémie de sida. 
8
 This is the case for instance for the “scientific revolution”. Shapin, The Scientific Revolution. 
9
 Researchers working on the construction of public issues and on public policy have greatly 
contributed to the development of research on risks issues. Hilgartner, „The Political Language of 
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Risk: Defining Occupational Health‟ 25; Hilgartner, Science on Stage; Gibert, Risques collectifs et 
situations de crises. 
10
 Bosso, Pesticides and Politics; Boudia, „Naissance, extinction et rebonds d‟une controverse 
scientifique : les dangers de la radioactivité pendant la guerre froide‟. 
11
 Slovic, „Perception of Risk‟. 
12
 Krimsky and Wrubel, Agricultural Biotechnology and the Environment. 
13
 Knorr-Cetina, Epistemic cultures. 
14
On the historiography of environmental history see: http://www.h-
net.org/~environ/historiography/historiography.html and Mitman, Murphy et Sellers, Landscape of 
Exposure.  
15
 Chirnside and Hamence, The "Practising Chemists"; Hamlin, A Science of Impurity; Barles, La 
ville délétère. 
16
 Young, Pure Food.  
17
 Meisner and Tarr (eds), Special Issue on Environmental History; Büschenfeld, Flüsse und 
Kloaken; Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink; Bowler and Brimblecombe, „Control of Air 
Pollution in Manchester prior to the Public Health Act, 1875‟; Thorsheim, Inventing Air Pollution; 
Bernhardt, Environmental Problems in European Cities.  
18
 Whorton, Public Health in Pre DDT area.  
19
 Dahan and Pestre, Les sciences pour la guerre. 
20
 This debate already took place in the XIXth century: Hamlin, „Scientific Method and Expert 
Witnessing: Victorian Perspectives on a Modern Problem‟, 485. 
21
 Jasanoff, States of Knowledge. Halfmann, Boundaries of Regulatory Science. 
22
 Markowitz and Rosner, Deceit and Denial; Egilman, Rankin and Bohme, „Over a Barrel: 
Corporate Corruption of Science and its Effects on Workers and the Environment‟.  
23
 Heyvaert, „Reconceptualizing Risk Assessment‟. 
24
 Abraham and Reed, „Progress, Innovation and Regulatory Science in Drug Development: The 
Politics of International Standard-Setting‟, 337. 
25
 Giddens, lecture 3. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith_99. 
26
 Desrosières, La politique des grands nombres; Porter, Trust in Numbers. 
27
 On the importance to work on invisibility phenomena see: Honneth, „Invisibility: on the 
Epistemology of „Recognition‟. 
28
 On Bhopal see: Morhouse and Subramaniam, The Bhopal Tragedy; Lapierre and Moro, Five 
Past Midnight in Bhopal.  
29
 For examples of works taking into account this dimension see: Markowitz and Rosner, Dying 
for Work. Vallianatos, Harvest of Devastation. Murray. Cultivating Crisis; Nicollini, Il pane 
attossicato; Warren, Brush with Death.  
30
 Thus Beck explained: “Consider the intellectual situation in Europe after 1989. A whole world 
order had broken down. What an opportunity to adventure into the new! But we stick to old 
concepts and ideas, and make the same mistakes. There is even a kind of left protectionism and a 
switch of position. As Anthony Giddens has pointed out, radical socialism has become 
conservative and conservatism has become radical. We have to rediscover this crazy, mad-cow 
disease world sociologically, and the script of modernity has to be rewritten, redifined, reinvented. 
This is what the theory of world risk society is about.” Beck, „Politics of Risk Society‟, 8. 
31
 Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, Agir dans un monde incertain; Jasanoff, States of Knowledge. 
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